Sunday 17 December 2017

The cuckoo’s egg in the Nobel nest



Avner Offer & Gabriel Söderberg (2016). The Nobel Factor: The Prize in Economics, Social Democracy and the Market Turn. Oxford: Princeton University Press, pp. 323



Prizes and honours are not just acknowledgement of merit and excellence in a given field, they are rituals and symbols, as well.  The Nobel prize, annually given to outstanding work in various disciplines, has particularly acquired an aura and prestige that makes it an unrivalled realm of excellence. The four institutes of authority who select the winners of the Nobel prizes are the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, the Swedish Academy, Karolinska Institute and the Norwegian Parliament (for the peace prize). The Nobel memorial prize in Economics differs from the other prizes because it was constituted by the Swedish central bank in memory of Alfred Nobel in 1969, and was not one of the original prizes awarded since 1901. One of the earliest critiques of the economic prize was that economics was driven in the real world by politics. However, over the years, economists have brought in a particular use of ‘scientific method’ to economics and argue that economics remains closer to the physical sciences in methodology. This book looks at this argument and critiques it both with respect to methodology, and ideology that guides economics in practice. The authors argue that the construction of ‘merit’ of economics has been through calculated deliberation in a way that outcomes are increasingly difficult to predict. There is an assumption that there could be an objective criterion for ranking merit and the Nobel committee has a methodology to reach this calculus.

Model thinking and market turn
The authors begin their argument by invoking the historical thinking that placed economics as political management of economy or moral philosophy by Adam Smith and John Mill. This earlier tradition was opposed with the introduction of positivist thinking in the mid twentieth century. Milton Friedman’s article ‘The methodology of positivist economics’ published in 1953 is one such example.  The authors argue that ‘model thinking’ in economics began with this market turn. Formalist branches of economics use model, not as a plausible representation of the world, but as an instrument with internal consistency. The criteria of validation from the empirical world is not a necessity. As a result, models of economics not only diverge from real world situations, but predictions based on these models routinely fail.

The impact of formalist economics has been to vilify models that actually work on the ground. The authors give the example of welfare state. Social democratic forms of state offer two kinds of support structures against uncertainty and risk.  At an individual level, risk is reduced through state-supported housing, education and healthcare and at a collective level, life-cycle dependencies are met through welfare. This mechanism involves two types of transfers- transfer from present to the future in an individual life and lateral transfers across generations in a society. These support structures have been the bedrock of prosperous and equitable societies in many countries. The rational model thinking economics, by critiquing the inefficiency of this system, has pushed societies into market-centrism. This has resulted in an unprecedented vulnerability of many sections of society.

Decoding Nobel prize impact
Did the most visible prize in economics have a role to play in the way economics is envisaged today? Offer and Söderberg use an interesting methodology of correlating citation of prize winning academic papers, ideology implied in the arguments and economic prize winners to determine whether the prize had a definitive (ideological) market turn. Their empirical study over the period till 2005, show three interesting results. First, the economics prize has been awarded on a balance between ideologies of left and the right, formalists and empiricists, Chicago school and Keynesians with the exception of the period 1990-1997, when all winners were of the neoliberal argument. Second, there has been a decided shift from work that was predominantly theoretical to that which is empirical. For instance, in 1983, 57.6 per cent of the total articles published in the top three journals in economics were theoretical, where as it was 19.1 per cent in 2011. On the other hand, empirical articles jumped from 3.2 per cent in 1983 to 42.2 per cent (Offer and Söderberg, p. 56). Third, the authors argue that of all the prize-cited works of economists up to 2005, only 5 percent were based on the scientifically rigorous idea of falsification, 12 per cent were of less reliable verification criterion and 20 per cent of confirmation criterion that was not supported by the scientific method. In other words, going by the strict criteria of scientific method, only a few works in economics would comply with the rigour.


The ultimate argument of the book is that the mechanical balancing act of the selecting prize winners in economics belies the belief in scientific regularity and reasoning that is believed to be at the heart of the discipline.  Choices in economics is a matter of preference and not fact. Real choices are difficult to make within a situation of unknown future, risk and uncertainty. Rather than reason, discretion becomes a commitment device for individuals. Economic choices may be driven by non-economic factors like ethical and normative preferences in addition to seemingly irrational decisions taken as a result of cognitive limitations. The ‘merit’ of the Nobel winner then becomes a task of ‘construction’ that is driven by extraneous considerations like ideology. The Nobel memorial prize begins to look a lot like that of literature and peace than those of the sciences.